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PROTECTING THE INNOCENT OR
PROTECTING SPECIAL INTERESTS?
CHILD LABOR, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE

WTO
Dexter Samida

INTRODUCTION
For those in wealthy countries, the idea of children toiling in factories or
fields seems like a relic from a bygone age. However, for too many children in the
world this is still a sad reality. Many children work in hazardous conditions.
There were an estimated 211 million children working worldwide in 2000.1 Of
these 211 million children, approximately 8.4 million were involved in child
trafficking, forced and bonded labor, armed conflict, prostitution and pornography,
2
and other illicit activities-the worst of the worst forms of labor.
Poverty, income variability, debt, lack of access to credit, and lack of
educational opportunities are cited as causal factors. 3 This article focuses on the
oft-suggested link between trade and child labor.
This article considers two strategies that the international community might
consider in order to reduce the prevalence of child labor. Part I considers whether
countries can combat the scourge of child labor by becoming less open to foreign
trade and globalization. Specifically, this part of the article looks for empirical

* University of Saskatchewan, B.Comm. (1997); University of Toronto, M.A. (1997); Unveristy of
Chicago, J.D. Candidate (2005). The author expresses his sincere gratitude for the assistance of
University of Chicago law school professors David A. Weisbach and Alan 0. Sykes. Martin Zelder,
Senior Research Professional at the University of Chicago. provided useful advice on statistics and

economic theory.
1. INT'L PROGRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOUR, ILO, EVERY CHILD COUNTS:
NEW

GLOBAL

ESTIMATES

ON

CHILD

LABOUR

20

(2002),

available

at

http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/others/globalest.pdf [hereinafter IPEC]. This
estimate uses a more expansive definition of child labor (ages 5 to 14) than that considered below. See
infra the text accompanying note 24 for an explanation of the numbers used in this article.
2. IPEC, supranote 1, at 25.
3. See ROBERT T. JENSEN, ILO, DEVELOPMENT OF INDICATORS ON CHILD LABOR 8-15 (2000)
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/guides/jensen.pdf (noting that
because there is evidence that credit restraints are associated with higher levels of child labor, providing
credit to poor households could somewhat alleviate this problem); See generally KATHLEEN BEEGLE ET
AL., CHILD LABOR, CROP SHOCKS, AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,

Working Paper No. 10088, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl0088 (considering the
relationship between a mother's education and her children's level of educational attainment); See, e.g.,
ALESSANDRO CIGNO ET AL., CHILD LABOR, NUTRITION

AND EDUCATION IN RURAL INDIA: AN

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PARENTAL CHOICE AND POLICY OPTIONS 34-35 (2001).
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evidence supporting or negating the link between globalization and child labor.
Part II considers the potential effectiveness of a unilateral U.S. trade ban and
whether such a ban would be legal under World Trade Organization law.
I. GLOBALIZATION AND CHILD LABOR

The fact is that the [World Trade Organization]'s policies
conditions for the accentuation of poverty and the decline in the
workers everywhere. Child labor is one manifestation or effect of
being placed on the majority of the world's population under
4
economic regime.

are creating
condition of
the demands
a neoliberal

If globalization is responsible for vast increases in the prevalence of child
labor then more restrictive trade policies should enable developing countries to
combat the growth of child labor. This argument relies on the assumption that
globalization is in fact causing more child labor. Many commentators are
convinced there is a link.
For example, Madeleine Grey Bullard, in her award-winning journal article, 5
argues that "[g]lobalization could offer children an escape from lives of toil and
drudgery, but instead, it draws more children into servitude."'6 In nearly identical
words, Bullard's source for that assertion claims the same thing. 7 Interestingly,
neither article has figures demonstrating that an increase in child labor has in fact
8
occurred, irrespective of the cause.
Other commentators claim that there is evidence that "increasing numbers of
children migrate from their natal homes as opportunities for work expand in nearby
towns or distant cities." 9 For example, in early American society, families moved
to areas where child labor was in demand, even if this tended to reduce wages
earned by the adult wage earner. 10 It is in this way that some perceive the export
4. Saadia Toor, Child Labor in Pakistan: Coming ofAge in the New World Order, 575 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 194, 203-04 (2001). Claims that capitalism is the cause of child labor are
not new. For example, see Edwin Markham, The Hoe-Man in the Making, COSMOPOLITAN (Sept. 1906)
reprinted in MUCKRAKING! THE JOURNALIsM THAT CHANGED AMERICA 4, 6 (Judith Serrin & William
Serrin eds., New Press 2002) ("The factory, we are told, must make a certain profit, or the owners
(absentee proprietors generally, living in larded luxury) will complain.... It pays, my masters, to grind
little children into dividends!").
5. Madeleine Grey Bullard, Child Labor ProhibitionsAre Universal, Binding, and Obligatory
Law: The Evolving State of Customary International Law Concerning The Unempowered Child
Laborer, 24 Hous. J. INTL L. 139, 139 (2001). The article received the American Civil Liberties Union,
Ben G. Levy, Essays in Freedom Award.
6. Id.at 156.
7. See Robert Senser, How the Global Economy Promotes Child Labor, available at
http://www.senser.conclali.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005) (stating that "[tihe global economy should
offer little children an escape from lives of forced labor. Instead, it is drawing more and more of them
into various types of servitude.").
8. See generally tbl. 1 infra page 6.
9. Rachel Baker & Rachel Hinton, Approaches to Children's Work and Rights in Nepal, 575
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 176, 178 (2001).

10. Donald 0. Parsons & Claudia Goldin, Parental Altruism and Self-Interest: Child Labor
Among Late Nineteenth-Century American Families, ECON. INQUIRY, Oct. 1989, at 637, 655-57
(estimating that around 90% of the income generated by working children in a family was dissipated
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sector to be the most direct link between child labor and globalization. 11 This is a
possible connection, and it is one of the critiques of the North American Free
Trade Agreement. 12 Furthermore, some argue that opening up the export sector
increases the opportunities for unskilled labor which could in turn draw children
13
into the workforce.
However, this argument glosses over the fact that the child who relocates in
order to find work in the export sector may have previously worked at a less
desirable job. Export jobs are not the only source of employment for child
laborers-only the most visible. 14 In reality only a small percentage of child
laborers work in the export sector.' 5 Given this, even a large increase in the size6 of
the export sector will have only limited effects on the number of child laborers.'

through lower adult male wages); See Kaushik Basu & Zafis Tzannatos, The Global Child Labor
Problem: What Do We Know and What Can We Do?, 17 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 147, 150-51
(2003) (arguing that there are multiple equilibriums including a "bad" equilibrium where high levels of
child labor push down adult wages. Under this scenario a ban on child labor would be welfare
enhancing).
11. Toor, supra note 4, at 217 ("When we talk about globalization creating the conditions (through
the disembeddedness of the economic from the social) for the increasing exploitation of child labor in
countries of the South, it does not mean only in the export sector, although the export sector is perhaps
the most direct link.").
12. See, e.g., Joshua Briones, Student Scholarship: Paying the PriceForNAFTA: NAFTA 's Effect
on Women and Children Laborers in Mexico, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301, 307 (1999); Joan M. Smith,
North American Free Trade and the Exploitation of Working Children, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 57, 63 (1994) ("[T]here is serious cause for concern that the industrial growth projected under
NAFTA will produce greater exploitation of children.").
13. See, e.g., ERIC V. EDMONDS & NINA PAVCNIK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CHILD LABOR:
CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE 18-19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10317, 2004),
availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w10317. The authors consider this argument in their paper and
conclude that "the evidence [of their empirical research]... does not find any significant support for
that claim." Id. at 19.
14. See, e.g., Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and ProductLabeling Schemes: The
Limits and Possibilitiesof PromotingInternationalLabor Rights Through PrivateInitiatives, 30 LAW
& POL'Y. INT'L BUS. 111,140 (describing non-export industries as "invisible" industries).
15. See U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, BY THE SWEAT AND TOIL OF CHILDREN: THE USE OF CHILD
at
available
(1994),
2
IMPORTS
AMERICAN
IN
LABOR

http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/sweat/sweat.pdf (estimating that export markets may
account for as little as 5% of total employment of child laborers).
16. Even if the number of child laborers did increase due to an expansion of the export sector this
might not be all bad. Increased employment demand might (for children and their parents) increase
wages, improve working conditions, or both.
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Moreover, globalization and foreign trade tend to increase incomes.1 7 To the
extent that trade increases family incomes it may lessen families' reliance on child
labor and may move children from the workplace into the classroom.
a. Recent Trends
Linda Golodner, President of the National Consumers League, asserts that
"[t]he problem of child labor has grown along with the expansion of the global
marketplace." 18 An article by Timothy A. Glut seems to provide evidence for this
assertion. He claims that the number of child laborers has increased by 112
million in only eight years.19 He states:
In late 1994, the International Labo[u]r Organization (ILO) estimated that
there were 200 million child laborers in the world's work force.... These
statistics contrast sharply with earlier studies. In 1986, the ILO estimated that
there were only eighty-eight million child workers. This dangerous increase in
the amount of child labor illustrates the ineffectiveness of current measures to
20
curtail child labor.

Glut, however, neglects to cite any actual ILO studies. Instead the author cites
newspaper articles in the Detroit Free Press, L.A. Times, and the Washington
Post.21 His inattention to the actual numbers hides the great improvements that
have been made and creates the impression that something drastic needs to be
done.
Data from the International Labour Office, compiled in Table 1, tells a much
different story. 22 In 1960, twenty five percent of world's children worked. 23 That

17. See, e.g., Axel Dreher, Does Globalization Affect Growth?, at 14 (2003), available at
http://econwpa.wustl.edu/eps/dev/papers/0210/0210004.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005) (concluding that
economic integration leads to faster rates of growth); See DAVID DOLLAR & AART KRAAY, TRADE,
GROWTH, AND POVERTY 2 (world Bank, Working Paper No. 2615, 2001), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/pdfiles/Trade5.pdf (stating that developing countries that
have "globalized" have grown faster even as wealthier nations growth rates have slowed). Trade
between nations also tends to reduce income gaps between those nations. DAN BEN-DAVID & AYAL
KIMHI, TRADE AND THE RATE OF INCOME CONVERGENCE 16 (Nat'l. Bureau of Econ. Res., Working
Paper No. 7642, 2000), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7642.pdf. Finally, some writers
claim that globalization induces better governance. FEDERICO BONAGLIA ET AL., How GLOBALISATION
IMPROVES GOVERNANCE 28 (OECD Development Centre, Working Paper No.181, 2001) available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/48/2675871.pdf.
18. Linda F. Golodner, Address at the National Consumers League (Jan. 21, 1998), available at
http://nclnet.org/advocacy/workersrights/speech child labor 01211998.htm.
19. Timothy A. Glut, Changingthe Approach to Ending Child Labor: An InternationalSolution to
an InternationalProblem, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.1203, 1206-07 (1995). See also id., at 1207 n.19
(postulating that, in percentage terms, there has been an "over 100% increase in child labor." Glut also
argues that the increase "cannot simply be attributed to a greater number of children in the world.").
20. Id. at 1206-07 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1207; See also id., at 1207 n.15, 1207 n.18.
22. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2002), available at
http://laborsta.ilo.org/ [hereinafter World Bank Data] This study looks at the amount of economically
active children. For the purposes of this study, the term "child" is restricted to children aged 10-14. The
next age group, 15-19, contains some people generally not considered children. Data for younger
children is not available by country. Researchers generally believe that the term "child labor" should
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same year, 39 percent of children in Sub-Saharan Africa worked, as did 38 percent
of children in East Asia and the Pacific. 24 By 2000, the percentages of children
working in the world and Asia had dropped to 11 percent and 8 percent,
respectively, while the percentage of children working in Sub-Saharan Africa had
dropped to 29 percent. 25 None of these areas has seen an increase in the
26
prevalence of child labor.

Table 1. Prevalence of Child Labor by Region
Region
East Asia & Pacific

1960,

27

1970

1980

1990

1995

2000

37.82%

32.83%

26.23%

14.27%

11.18%

8.06%

4.71%

3.55%

3.34%

2.80%

1.97%

1.11%

16.59%

14.64%

12.70%

11.27%

9.87%

8.23%

Europe & Central Asia
Latin America &
Caribbean
Middle East & North
Africa

21.61%

18.58%

14.03%

7.80%

6.06%

4.38%

South Asia

31.76%

27.29%

23.35%

19.39%

17.32%

15.03%

Sub-Saharan Africa

39.06%

36.66%

34.71%

32.21%

30.33%

28.99%

World

24.85%

22.20%

19.86%

14.61%

13.08%

11.33%

Table 2 looks at the prevalence (expressed in percentage terms) of child labor
and the total numbers of child laborers in: the world; more developed regions; less
developed regions; and the ten countries that in 2000 had the highest prevalence of
child labor. It illustrates how child labor has declined overall since 1960. Even in
countries that have increased numbers of child laborers the ratio of child workers
to non-workers has fallen, in some places dramatically.

not encompass all work children do (such as light chores). See IPEC, supra note 1, at 32-33. However,
separate data is not available.
23. See World Bank Data, supra note 22; see supra Part I., at tbl. 1.
24. See World Bank Data, supra note 22; see supra Part I., at tbl. 1.
25. See World Bank Data, supra note 22; see supra Part I., at thl. 1.
26. See World Bank Data, supra note 22; see supra Part I., at tbl. 1. This statement can be made
even stronger. Only five of the 171 countries measured have seen any increase in the prevalence of
child labor during the time period evaluated. In 1960 the Dominican Republic had 25.7% of the
children aged 10-14 working. In 1970 the rate went up to 31.6% and subsequently down to 24.8% in
1980. In Kenya the rate went from 44.96% in 1970 to 45.06% in 1980. In 1990 the rate dropped to
43.4%. Nicaragua saw a 0.82 percentage point increase between 1960 and 1970, followed by a
subsequent decline. Similarly, the United Arab Emirates and the United States had temporary increases
of 0.45 and 0.10 percentage points respectively in the same time period, also followed by declines.
27. See World Bank Data, supra note 22.
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Table 2. Selected Regions and Child Labor

28

Thousands

Rates
1960

2000

1960

2000
67444

24.7%

11.2%

76420

More developed regions

3.0%

0.0%

2434

17

Less developed regions

32.4%

13.0%

73985

67427

Bhutan

69.1%

51.1%

65

136

Burkina Faso

79.4%

43.5%

426

686

Ethiopia

50.8%

41.1%

1386

3277

Kenya

46.3%

39.2%

435

1699

Mali

63.7%

51.1%

329

726

Nepal

70.7%

42.1%

797

1154

Niger

49.9%

43.6%

182

609

Rwanda

44.2%

41.4%

152

413

Uganda

51.9%

43.8%

438

1343

World

Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 3, the countries that had the biggest
expansion in their export sectors also had the biggest reductions in the prevalence
29
of child labor.

Table 3. Exports and Child Labor
Change in Exports (1995-2000)

-21.3%

2.7%

22.1%

61.4%

Change in Child Labor (1995-2000)

-18.2%

-25.0%

-22.8%

-31.2%

I

Some commentators rightly suggest that child labor is difficult to define, find,
and measure.3 0 Nevertheless, these commentators are content in claiming that
child labor is a serious and increasing problem.3 1 The ILO itself cautions that it is
difficult to make comparisons over different years.3 2 While one should be cautious
in using this data in empirical models, it would be wrong to exempt the claims of
anti-globalization writers from empirical scrutiny simply because the data is
difficult to collect.

28. Table 2 was complied from World Bank Data, supra note 22.
29. Table 3 was compiled from World Bank Data, supra note 22. It only includes countries that
had some positive level of child labor in 1995. The data was broken into quartiles and then analyzed.
The percentage change in child labor was calculated by the deducting the prevalence of child labor in
1995 from the 2000 value and then dividing by the 1995 level. Growth of the export sector was
calculated in a similar fashion.
30. Joan M. Smith, supra note 12, at 63.
31. Id.
32. IPEC, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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b. Previous EmpiricalStudies
Trade liberalization has had a positive effect on the prevalence of child labor
in Vietnam. One examination of the country indicated that trade liberalization in
the rice market moved one million children out of child labor by increasing family
incomes.3 3 The declines were greatest for secondary school-aged girls, who were
34
consequently more likely to attend school.
As for a cross-section of countries, a recent study found no evidence that
greater openness to trade led to higher levels of child labor.3 5 The authors
concluded that while greater openness is correlated with a lower prevalence of
child labor, this effect was statistically insignificant once the study was controlled
for income differences across countries. 3 6 They also concluded that there was no
evidence that increased trade leads to product demand changes which in turn leads
to increases in child labor.3 7 They found no evidence that child labor is related to
the heterogeneity of skill endowments, capital scarcity, or the signing of anti-child
labor agreements. 38 Additionally, they concluded that child labor is not driven by
39
increases in exports of products made by unskilled labor.
Other authors agree with this evaluation. One critique concludes that high
levels of child labor might be attributable to an absence of globalization, rather
than to too much of it. 40 The article uses the Sachs-Warner index of openness,
4
along with a number of control variables. '
A cross-sectional study of countries by Robert Shelburne came to similar
conclusions. 42 Shelburne's article used imports and exports as a percent of GNP as
a measure of openness, along with a number of control variables. 43 He found that
countries that are small, poor, and less open to international trade have a greater
44
prevalence of child labor.

33. See ERIC EDMONDS & NINA PAVCNIK, DOES GLOBALIZATION INCREASE CHILD LABOR?

EVIDENCE FROM VIETNAM 31 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8760, 2000),
availableat http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8760.pdf.
34. Id. at 28-29.
35. See EDMONDS & PAVCNIK, supranote 13.
36. Id. at 22-23.
37. Id. at 23.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 18-19, tbl 5.
40. ALESSANDRO CIGNO ET AL., Does Globalization Increase Child Labor?, 30 WORLD
DEVELOPMENT 1579, 1587 (2002); Stanley Fischer, Globalisation and Its Challenges, 93 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 33 (2003), available at http://www.iie.com/fischer/pdf/fischer011903.pdf (echoing this
sentiment and concluding, "the pro-market pro-globalization approach is the worst economic policy,
except for all the others that have been tried.").
41. ALESSANDRO CIGNO ET AL., supra note 40, at 1585-86.
42. Robert C. Shelbume, An Explanationof the InternationalVariationin the Prevalence of Child
Labour, 24 WORLD ECON. 359, 374-75 (2001).
43. Id. at 372.
44. Id.
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c. New Regressions
This Article builds upon the work of Shelbume. His model of child labor is
represented by the following equation:

CHILAB = a(PCI)6'(OPEN)i2 (GNP)633
CHILAB is the percentage of children not in the workforce; PCI is per capita
income; OPEN is imports and exports as a percentage of GNP; and GNP is gross
national product. 45 An exponential function was utilized for this Article because
46
that was the functional form chosen by Shelburne.
Some believe poverty increases child labor.47 If true, child labor should
decrease as per capita income (PCI) increases. 48 Shelburne uses OPEN to test the
influence of openness on the amount of child labor. 49 Shelburne hypothesizes that
in a closed economy the introduction of child labor will, on net, benefit the non50
child-labor factors of production (although with varying distributional effects).
In an open economy the benefits of child labor accrue to the children (or their
parents), which suggests that open economies will tend to have less child labor.5 1
Shelbume uses GNP as a measure of economic size. 52 Shelburne argues that for

45. Id. at 372-73. Shelburne used 1996 values for each variable Shelburne also used a dummy
variable for countries with a history of communist rule. Since the dummy variable had little influence
on the results it is dropped here.
46. Id. at 376. Shelburne utilized a Box-Cox procedure to pick the functional form which would
minimize the residual sum of errors. Representative linear equations were estimated for this article (but
not reported). The results were similar to the regressions reported in this article.
47. See Sudharshan Canagarajah & Helena Skyt Nielsen, Child Labor In Africa: A Comparative
Study, 575 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 71 (2001).
48. Shelburne, supra note 42, at 369.
49. Id. at 370.
50. Id. at 365 (suggesting that in a three factor world capital and skilled laborers will benefit from
the introduction of child labor,unskilled laborers without children will be harmed, and unskilled
laborers with children would most likely benefit).
51. Id. at 364. Shelburne concludes "[t]hus in a closed economy the non-child-labour factors gain
from child labour, while they do not in an open economy. Therefore, ceteris paribus, one would expect
on a cross-section that where an economy is open to international trade, there is less likely to be child
labour." Id at 366. To illustrate, assume Country X is a closed economy where production equals
consumption. When child labor is introduced the non-child-labor factors of production can still produce
the same combinations of labor-intensive and non-labor-intensive goods. However, the price of the
labor-intensive goods falls allowing them to expand their utility. They can produce at one point and
trade with the child-labor factor of production until they maximize utility. Although the net effect of
the allowance of child labor is positive for the non-child-labor factors as a whole, distributional effects
may make some groups worse off such as wage earners in the labor-intensive market. Next, assume
Country Y is an open economy that cannot influence the world price. When Country Y allows child
labor prices do not change. All non-child-labor factors of production receive the same benefits. Childlabor is paid its marginal productivity, and thus gains. If the decision to allow child labor is set by
consensus (through norm creation or legislation) Country X (the closed economy) is more likely to
allow child labor as more factors of production benefit from its introduction.
52. Id. at 371.

2005

CHILD LABOR, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE

WTO

large, open economies the introduction of child labor changes the terms of trade,
making the non-child-labor factors of production worse off.53 Smaller countries
cannot affect the terms of trade and therefore the non-child-labor factors are not
made worse off on the whole when child labor is introduced (although there are
4
distributional effects-some factors are made worse off and some better off).5
55
This suggests smaller countries would be more likely to utilize child labor.
Shelburne's article suggests that smaller, poorer, and less open countries have
a greater prevalence of child labor. 56 This result, while interesting, does not fully
address the present issue. His article suggests that at a given point in time, lower
levels of child labor are correlated with higher levels of trade. 57 However, his
results do not indicate whether an increase in the level of global trade over time
leads to an increase in the level of child labor.
It is also not clear that the selected measure for openness (imports and exports
as a ratio of GNP) is the best available measure. As previously mentioned, the link
between globalization and child labor is supposedly between the export sector and
child labor. 58 A better measure might therefore focus on exports.
In the following section the Shelbume-model of child labor is extended by
estimating the model for a larger number of time periods. This article will then
consider an alternative measure of trade openness and present some models of
dynamic change.
d. Discussion of Results
The first empirical model tested is based on the Shelburne-model of child
labor discussed above. 59 However, slightly different variables were used. Gross
60
National Income per person is used in place of the per capita income variable.
53. Id. at 376.
54. Id. at 375. The factors that compete with child labor are made worse off, while the other
factors are better off.
55. Id. at 369. To illustrate, assume Country X is a large open economy. Before the introduction
of child labor, manufacturers produce a certain level of goods and trade with the world to a point that
maximizes their utility. Since Country X is able to affect the prices of labor-intensive goods, it is
assumed that the products it trades in the world market are labor-intensive goods. When child labor is
introduced, the non-child-labor factors of production can still produce the same combinations of laborintensive and non-labor-intensive goods. However, the country's terms of trade have deteriorated. After
the introduction of child labor, Country X receives less skill-intensive goods for each unit of laborintensive goods it trades. This implies that the non-child-labor factors are unable to consume as much as
previously and are made worse off. The net effect for each factor depends on the distributional
consequences of the change. Country Y, a small open economy, does not affect the world price and
therefore the non-child-labor factors of production are not made worse off. Country Y is, therefore,
more likely to allow child labor.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 362.
58. See supra text accompanying note 11.
59. The analysis that follows builds on previous models, but I have added, expanded, or altered
those models.
60. See

National

Accounts:

Output

and

Expenditure,

at

http://www.worldbank.org/data/working/def7.html. Gross National Income is what the World Bank
now calls what was formerly Gross National Product (GNP).
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The openness variable uses gross domestic product (GDP) instead of GNP as its
denominator. 6 1 These changes are minor.
More importantly, instead of using only a single year, regressions were run
for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, and 2000. The results are presented in Table 5
of the Appendix. 62 The results replicate what was found previously: child labor is
more prevalent in poorer, smaller, and less open countries. Two measures of
openness were used. The first measure was similar to the measure used by
Shelbume-imports and exports as a percent of GDP. 63 The second measure was
exports as a percent of GDP.
Since the dependant variable is the percentage of children not in the
workforce, 64 positive coefficients mean that when the variable increases, more
65
children are not working, and therefore the prevalence of child labor is lower.
For each time period the OPEN variable is of the correct (positive) sign and is
highly statistically significant, indicating greater openness is associated with less
66
child labor.
The second model looks at the relationship between changes in the prevalence
of child labor and changes in the other variables. 67 If, as the opponents of
globalization believe, increased levels of trade increase child labor, the coefficients
for the OPEN variable should be negative. 68 If increased openness is unrelated to
child labor the coefficient will be zero. If increased openness was related to
decreases in the prevalence of child labor the coefficient will be positive.
The estimated changes represent the differences in each particular time
period, up to the year 2000. For example, the 1960 estimates look at changes in
each of the variables from 1960 to 2000. The results of this model are presented in
Table 6 of the Appendix.
Openness is essentially no different statistically than zero for each of the
estimates. 69 This suggests changes in the level of openness are unrelated to the
prevalence of child labor. Per capita income, however, is strongly statistically
significant (and the correct sign) for most of the time periods. 70 In other words,
increasing income leads to less child labor.

61. See World Development Indicators, supra note 22.
62. The Appendix begins on page 433.
63. See Shelburne, supra note 42.
64. This measure was used in order to allow the use of natural logarithms. It is not possible to take
the natural log of 0 (representing the percent of children in the workforce). However, it is possible to
take the natural log of 100 (representing the percent of children not in the workforce).
65. See infra app., at tbl. 5.
66. See infra app., at tbl. 5.
67. Since using changes creates negative variables a linear model was estimated. Data points
where the initial level of child labor was zero were eliminated.
68. The interpretation of coefficients is again slightly counterintuitive because the model looks at
the change in children not working. A negative coefficient means that if the variable increases there are
fewer children not working, in other words, more child labor.
69. See infra app., at tbl. 6. One estimate approaches statistical significance at a low level.
70. See infra app., at tbl. 7.
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One final model was used. This model looked at changes over separate tenyear periods (1960 to 1970, 1970 to 1980, 1980 to 1990, and 1990 to 2000).71 The
72
data was also pooled and considered as a whole.
The results are slightly different than before. As gross national income
expands, child labor decreases. 73 Gross national income per capita is not
statistically significant in either the ten-year interval estimate or the pooled data
estimate. 74 The coefficients for openness were almost statistically (and the correct
75
sign) significant at a low level.
These results suggest that increased globalization has not led to an increase in
the prevalence of child labor. Refusing to embrace further globalization will not
free developing nations from the existence of child labor. If trade increases
76
income, trade may indirectly lower the prevalence of child labor.
The next section focuses on the whether a unilateral trade ban would benefit
child laborers. It considers whether, even given the above analysis, a unilateral
trade ban targeted at goods produced with child labor is a good idea and whether it
would be legal under WTO law.
II. UNILATERAL TRADE BAN

a. Discussion
Some advocate for the United States' enactment of a unilateral trade ban on
goods produced using child labor. 77 However, as previously noted, only a small
percentage of child laborers are employed in the export sector-perhaps as low as
5 percent. 78 A trade ban would do little to protect child laborers if they found
work elsewhere. Presumably, for at least some children, the export sector is the
best option in terms of wages, working conditions, or both. 79 Even if a large
portion of child labor was involved in the export sector, a trade ban would simply
mean child labor would move elsewhere as the existence of an export sector itself
does not spawn child labor.80
Moving child laborers out of the export sector would tend to increase the
labor supply in other sectors, which could depress wages, lead to worse working

71. See infra app., at tbl. 7.
72. Instead of using differences this model used ratios (New Value/Old Value). This allowed the
use of the original mathematical form of the model.
73. See infra app., at tbl. 7.
74. See infra app., at tbl. 7.
75. The first definition of openness (imports and exports) was statistically significant at 16.4%.
The second definition (exports only) was significant at 15.48%.
76. See Dreher, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Benjamin James Stevenson, Pursuingan End to Foreign Child Labor Through U.S.
Trade Law: WTO Challenges and DoctrinalSolutions, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 129, 166
(2002); Matthew T. Mitro, Outlawing the Trade in Child Labor Products: Why the GA 7T Article XX
Health Exception Authorizes UnilateralSanctions, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 1223, 1271 (2002).
78. U.S. DEP'TOF LABOR, supra note 15, at 2.
79. Id.
80. See infra app., at tbl. 5.
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conditions, or both.81 Wages from foreign-owned entities8 2 tend to be higher than
domestic companies, and insomuch as the export sector is proportionately made up
of a greater number of foreign firms than domestic firms, 8 moving labor from this
sector to others could tend to reduce wages for those laborers even if the
movement did not depress wages in other sectors.
If, as is likely in at least some cases, necessity pushes children into working, a
unilateral trade ban could have the perverse effect of increasing the number of
hours children work. This would occur for children that moved to industries paying
84
lower wages.
These are not just idle concerns. The threat of the enactment of a law banning
imports of products produced with child labor led to the firing of fifty-five
thousand Bangladeshi children.8 5 A follow-up of a subset of these children found
that none had enrolled in school, half had found jobs paying less money (such as
prostitution, brick-laying, and selling flowers), and the other half were still looking
for work.8 6 Nutrition and health care were better for those children who kept their
jobs. Former workers circulated a petition to return to the factories at least part87
time.
One commentator speculates that early British laws banning child labor may
have increased (at least temporarily) its prevalence:
The effect of the laws was to impose a cost on firms that were found to be

employing children. It is arguable that the added cost, by making children less
attractive to hire, tended to lower their wages. But because children worked
81. This is not a shocking or controversial result. It is a proposition commonly taught in
introductory
labor
economics
classes.
See
Notes for Chapter
2, available at
http://www.oswego.edu/-economic/eco350/chap2.htm. (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). In other words, an
increase in labor supply results in a lower equilibrium wage, but a higher equilibrium level of
employment. Presumably non-child workers will tend to shift into the export sector if wages adjust.
The magnitude of the wage decline depends on how many of workers are able to shift.
82. See ROBERT E. LIPSEY & FREDERIK SjOHOLM, FOREIGN FIRMS AND INDONESIAN
MANUFACTURING WAGES: AN ANALYSIS WITH PANEL DATA (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,

Working Paper No. 9417, 2002), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w9417 (finding that when a
foreign-firm takes over a domestic-firm in Indonesia wages rise); ROBERT E. LIPSEY, HOME AND HOST
CouNTRY EFFECTS OF FDI (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9293, 2002), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9293
(summarizing the evidence regarding foreign-firms paying
higher wages); ZADIA FELICIANO & ROBERT E. LIPSEY, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND WAGES IN THE

UNITED STATES, 1987-1992 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6923, 1999),
availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w6923 (discussing Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States).
83. See FELICIANIO & LIPSEY, supra note 82, at 3.
84. See
Sonia
Bhalotra,
Is
Child
Work
Necessary?,
available
at
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0500.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005) (finding evidence that
Pakistani children work due to conditions of necessity and suggesting trade bans could actually increase
the number of hours children work).
85. Ben White, In the Best Interests of the Child?, at http://www.cwa.tnet.co.th/vol124/interest.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
86. Id.
THE

87. See White, supra note 85; See also CAROL BELLAMY, UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND,
STATE
OF
THE
WORLD'S
CHILDREN
23
(1997),
available
at

http://www.unicef.org/sowc97/download/sow Iof2.pdf.
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primarily to reach a minimal acceptable level of income for their households, a
lower hourly wage induced them to work longer hours. Hence, paradoxically,
the laws may have contributed to a worsening of child labor. The same risk is
there with modem laws, such as India's Child Labor Act of 1986, that impose
88
fines on firms that hire children.

This debate is reminiscent of the one over minimum wage laws-the
imposition of which often has unintended consequences. In Indonesia, for
example, labor legislation, such as minimum wage laws, have had a statistically
89
significant negative effect on employment in the formal sector of the economy.
Those suffering the greatest harm were women, the young, and the less educated. 90
Mandating higher wages or better working conditions is also likely to have
significant negative effects for industries under pressure to locate in low-cost
jurisdictions. 91 This would be true even if working conditions were enforced by a
worldwide policy, as employers would move to locations where the wage and
working conditions were justified by levels of productivity. 92 Chasing away
potential employers can only make things worse, as that would tend to also restrict
the opportunities available to the parents of the child laborers.
It is, therefore, not surprising that one of the most prominent child rights
groups-the United Nations Children's Fund-has labeled as a myth the idea that
boycotts and trade bans are the only way to lessen child labor. 93 In fact, a
UNICEF report seriously questions the efficacy of trade bans and their likely long94
term consequences.
In this light, it is hard to see how a trade ban would protect child laborers. A
ban would more likely help domestic special interests. Allowing trade bans based
on labor standards unfortunately "opens the door to possible abusive use of trade
barriers for protectionist reasons."'95 It is not surprising that some of the biggest

88. Kaushik Basu, The Economics of Child Labor, 289 SCI. AM. 84 (2003).
89. See generally ASEP SURYAHADI ET AL., Minimum Wage Policy and Its Impact on Employment
in the Urban Formal Sector, 39 BULL.OF INDONESIAN ECON. STUD. 29 (2003).
90. Id.
91. See DRUSILLA K. BROWN ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION ON WAGES
AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 10-11 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,

Working Paper No. 9669, 2003).
92. See id. at 11. An unfortunate example is South Africa where the unemployment rate is 40
percent. Labor standards, enacted at the behest of labor unions, have meant many jobs have been
exported to other developing countries. See Sharon LaFraniere, Low Labor Standard Leads South
Africans to ExportJobs, N.Y. TUMs, Mar. 13, 2004, at A3.
93. BELLAMY, supra note 87, at 21, 23-24.
94. Id. at 23-24.
95. Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GAT, ILO,
NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 177,
204 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds.,1996); Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and
the Law of InternationalTrade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (arguing that a unilateral trade ban on
child labor could be seen as a type of "regulatory protectionism." That is, a regulation that imposes
costs on foreign-producers "in a manner that is unnecessary to the attainment of some genuine,
nonprotectionist regulatory objective."). Child labor bans come within this definition as trade bans
affect costs of protection but are unlikely to reduce child labor.
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advocates of trade bans are unions, who couch their demands for special treatment
96
in more palatable terms.
Some have argued that in the past the United States has too readily imposed
unilateral trade sanctions and that these sanctions have been ineffective. 97 Worse
than being ineffective, unilateral trade bans targeting some of the world's poorest
countries could have quite pernicious effects on the living standards of the most
vulnerable in those countries.
b. Big Enough Stick?
A U.S. unilateral trade ban might prove ineffectual for another reason-the
United States is often not a large trading partner with poorer nations. If the United
States stops trading with a particular country or industry within that country, the
goods could be sold to other trading partners. For the fifteen countries with the
greatest levels of child labor, trade with the United States collectively accounts for
approximately 9.8 percent of their trade.9 8

96. See, e.g., Jenny Bates, InternationalTrade and Labor Standards, PROGRESSIVE POL'Y INST.,
Apr.
1,
2000,
available
at
http://
http://www.ppionline.org/ppici.cfmcontentid= 152&knlgArealD=1
I
08&subsecid=206.
97, Claude Barfield & Mark Groombridge, U.S. Unilateral Sanctions are Overused and
Undereffective, 8 AM. ENTERPRISE 76 (1997) (noting that "42 percent of the world's population live in
sanctioned countries" and that "sanctions are rarely effective").
98. See World Bank Data, supra note 22; see infra Part I1, at tbl. 4. The 9.8 percent figure is an
unweighted average of the U.S. trade figures. A weighted average might yield a different result. This
list only includes countries that had bilateral trade data.
This data is available at
ttp://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/intemational/wixd/index.html.
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Table 4. Child Labor and Trade Flows

Country

Child Labor
(% of children)

Exports
(% of GDP)

Imports
(% of GDP)

US Trade
(% of total
trade)

Mali

51.1%

25.0%

40.4%

1.0%

Bhutan

51.1%

29.6%

59.9%

2.4%

Burundi

48.5%

9.0%

23.6%

7.8%

Uganda

43.8%

10.1%

25.7%

8.5%

Niger

43.6%

15.5%

23.1%

15.9%

Burkina Faso

43.5%

10.7%

29.6%

0.6%

Nepal

42.1%

23.7%

32.0%

33.4%

Rwanda

41.4%

8.3%

24.1%

21.7%

Ethiopia

41.1%

15.4%

30.7%

11.1%

Kenya

39.2%

26.5%

35.6%

2.6%

Comoros

38.4%

15.7%

86.1%

18.4%

Tanzania

37.6%

25.6%

31.9%

3.9%

Guinea-Bissau

36.9%

14.7%

23.2%

1.4%

Chad

36.7%

31.8%

58.2%

1.3%

Madagascar

36.6%

16.6%

32.0%

17.0%

Table 4 shows that the countries with the highest levels of child labor tend
not to trade in significant amounts with the United States. Further, the trade sector
in many of these countries is small. This suggests that disruptions to trade flows
would have limited impacts on the economy. A unilateral trade ban targeting these
countries might have little effect if other countries continue to trade with them.
Even if a significant number of countries join together in a multilateral trade
ban, there is no guarantee this would result in net benefits. If a country that utilizes
child labor is unable to find new trading partners a broader trade ban could have
significant effects. Unfortunately, as illustrated above, it is very possible that these
significant effects would be deleterious. 100 Countries wishing to erect a trade ban
are in a precarious situation-in many cases the ban will not affect enough trade to
make much of a difference, and if the ban does make a difference there is little to
suggest the difference would be positive.
The next section focuses on the applicable WTO law. Despite spirited efforts
at trying to demonstrate that such a unilateral trade ban would be WTO legal, as
discussed below, these attempted justifications fail.

99. See World Bank Data supra note 22. Child labor, export, and import data is from 2000. The
prevalence of child labor represents the percent of those aged 10 to 14 that work.. The US trade data is
from 1990. US trade is calculated by dividing the dollar amount of US trade by the particular country's
total export trade flows.
100. See supra notes 29-43, 59- 76.

DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 33:3

c. WTO/GATTLaw
"With GATT, Asian and other slave-wage countries can send products to the
United States without any taxes. They will be able to use child labor, as it is not
prohibited by GATT."101
"The idea, however, that the WTO as it is, and with the name it carries, can
or will influence the destiny of most or even many child laborers, is completely
fanciful."1 02
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created with the
goal of lowering tariffs through a multilateral approach. 103 The present day World
Trade Organization (WTO) is the successor to the GATT. 10 4 The WTO Charter
105
contains the 1994 revised GATT, as well as a number of other agreements.
GATT Article XI contains a general prohibition of quantitative restrictions
including quotas. 106 A unilateral trade ban on goods produced using child labor
would contravene this article. It would not be permitted under WTO law unless it
107
fit within one of the exceptions contained in the agreement.
GATT Article XX provides a list of general exceptions, of which XX(b) is
the most applicable.' 08 Exception XX(b) allows a departure from GATT rules if
the measure is "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."' 109

101. Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REv. 658, 680 n.133 (1996) (quoting
William Pipher, NAFTA, GATT Will Ruin U.S. Economy, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Nov. 7, 1994, at A13
(letter to the editor)).
102. Sara Ann Dillon, A Deep Structure Connection: Child Labor and the World Trade
Organization,9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 443, 443 (2003).
103. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 211 (4h ed. 2002).

104. Id. at 218-19.
105. Id. at 219-20.
106. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XI reprinted in JOHN H.
JACKSON ET AL., 2002 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CASE, MATERIALS AND TEXT 28-29 (West 4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. Article

I could be implicated if the ban was targeted at particular countries, but not others. GATT 1994 art. I,
at 17-18.
107. See Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CAL. L. REv. 885, 890 (2003)
(discussing how labor issues might be incorporated into WTO law).
108. GATT 1994 art. XX, supra notel06, at 45-46. Some have argued that the XX(a) and XX(e)
exceptions could also apply in the context of unilateral child labor bans. See, e.g., Janelle M. Diller and
David A. Levy, Child Labor, Trade and Investment: Toward the Harmonizationof InternationalLaw,
91 AM. J. INT'L L. 663, 681-85 (1997) (noting that XX(a) applies to measures necessary to protect
public morals.). For the purposes of this Article, this argument is ignored given the improbability of its
success in front of a WTO panel. See Diego J. Linan Nogueras and Luis M. Hinojosa Martinez,
Human Rights Conditionality in the External Trade of the European Union: Legal and Legitimacy
Problems, 7 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 307328 (2001) (concluding "it is practically impossible to think that
Article XX(a) would permit a Member State to apply its concept of public morals extraterritorially");
but see Guzman, supra note 107, at 890-91 (discussing a potential XX(a) argument.). XX(e) applies to
measures "related to products of prison labor." For simplicity, this Article excludes from consideration
"forced" child labor, which is at least arguably similar to prison labor. According to ILO figures less
than 4% of child laborers are "forced or bonded laborers." See IPEC, supra note 1, at 25. This suggests
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In trying to fit a unilateral trade ban within this provision, commentators start
by arguing that child labor is hazardous to the health of the child laborers. 110 In
the abstract, this is not seriously in question."' The problem is that it is highly
unlikely that the elimination of child labor through labor bans actually promotes
human health. The decision whether to enter the labor force is likely made based
partially (if not totally in some cases) on necessity. 112 This necessity means
laborers frozen out of the export market are likely to move to other industriesindustries which may pay less, have worse working conditions, or both. The irony
is that a ban on child labor might actually increase the number of hours children
work.113
Without being able to link the ban with human health, the commentators
stumble. One author argues:
Child labor is a 'vital' health risk and, under a balancing approach, domestic
policymakers should be given wide deference to combat it. No reasonably
available alternatives to unilateral sanctions appear to be 'sufficiently effective.'
. .. The drafting history of Article XX(b) plays a supplementary role and does
not exclude the use of unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions. Furthermore, the
WTO Preamble objective of raising standards of living permits the pursuit of
114
properly delimited social objectives.
Ignoring the legality of sanctions for extraterritorial conduct, 1 5 this argument
relies on an unproven assertion: unilateral sanctions are effective in protecting the

significant difficulty in targeting industries that rely on this form of child labor making such bans
difficult to administer.
109. GATT 1994 art. XX(b), supra note 106, at 45. Timothy A.Glut has suggested that unilateral
trade bans might not be considered necessary given the availability of other measures to combat child
labor such as labeling. See Glut, supra note 19, at 1233-34. He notes that the word "necessary" in
Article XX(b) is problematic because GAIT Dispute Panels have interpreted the term to mean "the
least-GATT-inconsistent alternative that a country could reasonably be expected to employ" in order to
achieve its overriding public policy goals. Id. Glut further argues that because inconsistencies with
GATT must be unavoidable, "it is likely that a GATT Panel would find that alternatives such as a
product labeling requirement foreclose the availability of other trade sanctions." Id. at 1234. This
Article does not consider that argument.
110. Glut, supra note 19, at 1233; Benjamin James Stevenson, supra note 77, at 162; Matthew
Mitro, supra note 77, at 1243.
111. See ANACLAUDIA GASTAL FASSA, HEALTH BENEFITS OF ELIMINATING CHILD LABOUR 46
available
at
2003),
Paper
,
Working
(ILO
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/publ/download/pol-healthcostben-2003_en.pdf.
112. Bhalotra, supra note 84, at 24 (finding support for the contention that Pakistani children enter
the work force mainly due to conditions of necessity).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 84--8888.
114. Mitro, supra note 77, at 1260-61 (citations omitted).
115. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998,
WT/DS58/AB/R, for a discussion of when sanctions for extraterritorial conduct might be allowed in a
case litigated under Article XX(g). The Appellate Body noted:
Of course, it is not claimed that all populations of these species migrate to, or traverse, at one time or
another, waters subject to United States jurisdiction. Neither the appellant nor any of the appellees
claims any rights of exclusive ownership over the sea turtles, at least not while they are swimming
freely in their natural habitat -- the oceans. We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an
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health of child laborers by reducing the prevalence of child labor. As discussed
above, 116 such an assertion is unlikely to prove true in practice, therefore, any
claims that the measure protects child laborers must fail. 117
Further, the ban may also have to comply with the standards enunciated in
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. 118 A ban on child labor might be
considered a technical regulation as it would "lay[] down product characteristics or
their related processes and production methods... with which compliance is
mandatory." 119
Technical regulations should be created without "creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade" and "shall not be more traderestrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the
120
risks non-fulfillment would create."'
Proponents of such bans will again have a difficult time proving a ban on
child labor is necessary to prevent harm to human health, as discussed above. One
writer has also noted that the technical barriers agreement gives additional time to
developing nations to comply with proposed barriers.' 2 ' In particular, the
agreement states that "[m]embers shall, in the preparation and application of
implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that limitation. We
note only that in the specific circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the
migratory and endangered marine populations involved and the United States for purposes of Article
XX(g)," (emphasis added).
United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998,
WT/DS58/AB/R, at para. 133. This differs from the case of child labor in two respects. First, the
population of one nation is the exclusive concern of that nation's government. Second, there is little
nexus between the United States and foreign child laborers.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 18-32.
117. Robert Howse & Michael J. Treblicock, The Free Trade-Fair Trade Debate: Trade, Labor,
and the Environment, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW: COMPARATIVE AND

EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 186, 215 (Jagdeep S. Bhandair & Alan 0. Sykes, eds., 1997) (arguing that
the fact that the action is unilateral might be enough to condemn it. Unilateral action has previously
been condemned by a GATT panel as violating the requirement of necessity. The panel used a least
restrictive means approach and concluded that "since the United States had not exhausted the avenues
for a negotiated cooperative solution that would have avoided trade disruption" the measures could not
be considered "necessary.").
118. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., 2002 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASE, MATERIALS AND TEXT 149-73.

119. Id. at 164; See also Glut, supra note 19, at 1234. It is not entirely clear that a ban on child
labor would be considered a technical barrier under WTO case law. See European Communities Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-ContainingProducts, Sept. 18, 2000, WT/DS 135/AB/R, for
a discussion of this issue. In that case, the WTO Appellate Body limited the definition of "technical
barrier" to those regulations that deal with identifiable groups of products. Id. at para. 70. However,
they noted that a ban on asbestos did deal with an identifiable group of products-that is, all products.
Id. paras. 72, 74. According to the Appellate Body "product characteristics" include things like
"composition, size, shape, colour, texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity,
density, or viscosity." Id. at 67. This would seemingly exclude bans on child labor. There is no
discussion, however, on what constitutes a "related processes or production method." The use of child
labor might fit within this category.
120. GATT 1994 art. 2.2, supra note 106, at 150.
121. Glut, supra note 19, at 1234-35. See also GATT 1994 arts. 2.12, 12, supra note 106, at 151,
161-62.
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technical regulations... take account of the special development, financial and trade
needs of developing country Members. ' 122 This suggests that developing
countries would get additional leeway when defending themselves in front of a
WTO panel.
Given these obstacles it would be a mistake to use unilateral trade bans in the
name of protecting children. The danger of making things worse is too great and
the likely benefits are too small. A World Bank paper notes, "there is virtually no
economic case favoring the use of bilateral or multilateral trade penalties against
labor standards.... On the other hand, the economic case against such penalties is
strong."123
d. CountervailingDuties and GA TT
Some commentators suggest that child labor might be condemned under
international law as either a subsidy or as dumping. 124 Under GATT both
subsidized and dumped goods can have countervailing duties applied to them.125
However, child labor does not fit comfortably within either of these molds.
1. Subsidy
Under WTO law a subsidy is defined as a "financial contribution by a
government" where a "benefit is thereby conferred. ' 126 A financial contribution
includes, inter alia, a situation where "government revenue that is otherwise due is
foregone."'1 27 These requirements are likely to doom any claim that the allowance
of child labor is a subsidy.
Some argue that by failing to enforce laws regarding child laborers,
developing nations confer a benefit on producers who violate those laws with
impunity. 128 However, even if we assume that a subsidy exists, 29 the mere

122. GATT 1994 art. 12.3, supra notel06, at 161. See also GATT 1994, art. 12.4, supra note 106
("Members therefore recognize that developing country Members should not be expected to use
international standards as a basis for their technical regulations ... which are not appropriate to their
development, financial and trade needs.").
123. KEITH E. MASKUS, SHOULD CORE LABOR STANDARDS BE IMPOSED THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY? 67 (World Bank Working Paper No. 1817, 1997); see also Basu and
Tzannatos, supra note 10, at 151 (noting that "[in a very poor economy it is entirely possible that the
demand for labor is so low that . . .a ban on child labor can backfire, leaving the children and their
parents impoverished and risking starvation.").
124. Stevenson, supra note 77, at 164-66.
125. See GATT 1994 art. VI, supra note 106, at 23-24; Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., 2002 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASE, MATERIALS AND TEXT 174-97 [hereinafter Anti-dumping Agreement]; Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., 2002 DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASE, MATERIALS AND
TEXT 253-94 [hereinafter SCM].
126. SCM arts. l.l(a)(1),l.l(b), supra note 125, at 253.
127. SCM art. l.l(a)(l)(ii), supra note 125, at 253.
128. Stevenson, supranote 77, at 165. Though a weak argument, presumably the revenue forgone
could be the fines that could have been imposed. Daniel S. Ehrenberg argues that "'actionable'
subsidies should be expanded to include gross and persistent violations of the prohibition against forced
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existence of a subsidy is not condemned by the WTO. Subsidies are only
condemned if they are considered "specific" under Article 2 of the Subsidies
130
Agreement.
Specific subsidies are either export contingent,13 ' aimed at inducing import
substitution, 132 or targeted at a specific "enterprise or industry or group of
enterprises or industries."'1 33 Since this so-called "child labor subsidy" would be
available to any industry in the country, it would be considered a general subsidy
(allowable) rather than a specific subsidy (impermissible). 34 Therefore, under
WTO law the United States could not take action against this so-called 'subsidy.'
2. Social Dumping
The final argument 135 considered in this Article is whether allowing child
labor is a type of "social dumping."'1 36 Dumped goods are those sold at less than
their "normal value."'1 37 If dumping is found, the complaining nation may impose
a duty on the dumped goods so long as the duty is not greater than the margin of
38
dumping.1
While some argue that dumping should be found when a country lacks
appropriate levels of social legislation, 139 this is not supported by the text of
GATT. To find dumping a product's selling price in the importing nation must be
"less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product

or child labor." Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to
Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 393 n. 263 (1995). However,
as the agreement is currently written, there is no textual support for this expansion.
129. See generally, SCM supra note 125. A developing country that found itself in front of a WTO
panel would have a strong argument that there is no subsidy under the definition in the SCM agreement.
130. See SCM art. 2, supra note 125, at 254.
131. See SCM arts. 2.3, 3.1(a), supranote 125, at 254-55. Some might argue that the allowance of
child labor is actually export contingent. See Ehrenberg, supra note 128, at 393 n.265 (arguing that it is
difficult to classify subsidies, and that if the subsidy is given to all industries but export industries
primarily benefit, the subsidy "may be better classified as an export subsidy"); See U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, supra note 15, at 2. Given that the export sector employs only a small portion of all child
laborers such re-characterization is not appropriate here as the export industry does not receive a
majority of the benefits of child labor.
132. SCM arts. 2.3, 3.1(b), supra note 125, at 254-55.
133. SCM art. 2.1, supra note 125, at 254.
134. But see Ehrenberg, supra note 128, at 393 n. 265 (indicating that the subsidy must be
"specific" but arguing that a child labor subsidy should still be actionable).
135. See, e.g., Diller & Levy, supra note 108, at 685-686. Some have also argued that Article
XXIII of GATT 1994 might provide an avenue for attacking child labor. Since those arguing this agree
that the "use of Article XXIII in the context of child labor appears problematic under the new WTO
rules," this article will not consider the issue. See also GATT 1994 art. XXIII, supra note 106, at 47,
which states that the provisions of Article XXIII apply when "any benefit accruing to [a country]
directly or indirectly under [the] Agreement is being nullified or impaired ... as the result of ...the
application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions
of this Agreement."
136. Stevenson, supra note 77, at 164-66.
137. See GATT 1994 art. VI:1, supra note 106, at 23.
138. See GATT 1994 art. VI:2, supra note 106, at 23.
139. Stevenson, supra note 77, at 165; Ehrenberg, supra note 128, at 392-93.
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when destined for consumption in the exporting country. ' 140 If there are no
domestic prices the lower of the following should be used: "the highest comparable
price for the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of
trade" 141 or "the cost of production of the production in the country of origin plus a
reasonable addition for selling cost and profit. 1 42 None of these definitions allow
for consideration of the regulatory environment that generated the costs and prices
of the exporting nation. 143 None of these defmitions would result in finding the
price in the importing nation was lower than the price in the exporting nation due
to the use of child labor.1 44 If the export price is not lower there is no dumping
45
margin and there cannot be a countervailing duty.'
Furthermore, during GATT negotiations both Canada and the United States
argued that "dumping" should only refer to "price dumping."'1 46 The Cuban
delegation's proposal, which would have condemned dumping "whether practiced
through the mechanism of price, freight rates, currency depreciation, sweated
147
labor, or by any other means," was rejected.
Article VI was not meant to apply to so-called "social dumping" and should
not be expanded. If this "social dumping" argument was successful, the coverage
of this provision could conceivably apply anywhere labor standards differed
48
between nations-a result unlikely contemplated by the signatories of GATT.
From an economic standpoint, the case for harmonized labor standards is weak. In
fact, harmonization can end up hurting the poor nations that the proponents of such
1 49
harmonization claim they want to help.

140. See GATT 1994 art. VI:l(a) supra note 106, at 23.
141. GATT 1994 art. VI: I(b)(i), supranote 106, at 23.
142. GATT' 1994 art. VI: 1(b)(ii), supra note 106, at 23.
143. See GATT 1994 art. VI, supra note 106, at 23.
144. See Anti-dumping Agreement art. 2.1, supra note 125, at 174. If the price of the good was
cheaper by $2 because of the use of child labor, it would be sold for $2 less in both the exporting and
importing nations. See id. at 174-75 (definitions refer to prices and costs and not to the regulatory
environment that those costs were generated in); 19 USC § 1677(15) (2000) (requiring that the sale be
"inthe ordinary course of trade." This includes sales in the exporting country even if the product
embodies the work of children and refers to regular business practices. For example, under U.S. law the
term "means the conditions and practices which.., have been normal in the trade under consideration
with respect to merchandise of the same class or kind." This definition does not exclude the use of
child labor.).
145. See GATT 1994 art. VI:I, supra note 106, at 23. Additionally the complaining nation must
prove "material injury to an established industry." Some of the industries (such as carpet weaving) that
utilize child labor may not have a developed country counterpart, making them immune from this type
of attack. A developed country that has no harmed industry should have no ability to complain since
lower prices can only benefit that country.
146. See Diller and Levy, supra note 108, at 681.
147. Id. at 680-681; See also Stevenson, supra note 77, at 165.
148. See Belgian Family Allowances, Nov. 7, 1952, G/32 - IS/59 (declaring a government
procurement statute that imposed a levy on goods originating in countries deemed to have an inadequate
family allowance system to be a violation of GATT).
149. Drusilla K. Brown et al., InternationalLabor Standardsand Trade: A TheoreticalAnalysis, in
I FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 227, 269-72 (Jagdish
Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). Although these authors believe allowing child labor might
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CONCLUSION

Increased globalization has not been and will not be a major determinant of
the prevalence of child labor. Developing nations should not restrict trade in the
hopes of reducing child labor. Developed countries should not impose unilateral
trade bans on goods produced with child labor. First, the likely consequences of a
unilateral trade ban are negative, with the most vulnerable suffering the greatest.
Second, such action would be impermissible under WTO law.
Child labor is a problem that has afflicted every nation. As wealth has grown
the problem has receded. Protectionist demands disguised as humanitarian
concerns should be resisted. Trade should be allowed to continue to exert a
positive influence on standards of living across the globe.

be thought of as an "unfair" trade practice, they note that the imposition of a countervailing duty will
hurt labor in the low-income country. Id. at 270-272. They further note that gains from trade to highincome countries do not require the efficient allocation of resources in low-income countries; these
gains are generated from the ability to trade at prices different than the world without trade. Id. at 271.
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III. APPENDIX
Table 5. Child Labor and Openness (Static Model)- 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, and 2002
1980

1970

1960

(IMP +

(IMP +

(IMP +

EXP)

(EXP)

EXP)

(EXP)

EXP)

(EXP)

2.84***
(0.35)

3.01***
(0.29)

2.44***
(0.34)

2.64***
(0.26)

2.75***
(0.29)

2.88***
(0.22)

0.1709***
(0.03)

0.1708***
(0.03)

0.1077***
(0.02)

0.1056***
(0.02)

0.0951***
(0.02)

0.0874***
(0.02)

GNI

0.0106
(0.02)

0.0073
(0.02)

0.0390**
(0.02)

0.0355***
(0.01)

0.0273**
(0.01)

0.0266**
(0.01)

OPEN

0.09**
(0.04)

0.08**
(0.03)

0.11***
(0.04)

0.10***
(0.03)

0.08**
(0.03)

0.08***
(0.03)

58.7

58.7

60.8

61.8

59.9

60.8

84

84

103

103

122

122

(IMP +
EXP)

(EXP)

(IMP +
EXP)

(EXP)

(IMP +
EXP)

(EXP)

2.98***
(0.24)

3.19***
(0.18)

3.15***
(0.23)

3.38***
(0.17)

3.17***
(0.21)

3.37***
(0.16)

GNI per Capita

0.0647***
(0.01)

0.0600***
(0.01)

0.0589***
(0.01)

0.0578***
(0.01)

0.0558***
(0.01)

0.0527***
(0.01)

GNI

0.0249**
(0.01)

0.0217**
(0.01)

0.0205**
(0.01)

0.0164"*
(0.01)

0.0200**
(0.01)

0.0166*s
(0.01)

OPEN

0.10**
(0.03)

0.09***
(0.02)

0.09***
(0.03)

0.08***
(0.02)

0.10**
(0.03)

0.09***
(0.02)

51.9

52.9

50.1

50.2

Constant
GNI per Capita

R-2

n

Constant

R2 =

2000

1995

1990

50.0

51.5

137
137
151
151
144
144
n=
A positive coefficient means as the variable increases, the prevalence of child labor decreases.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * means statistically significant at the 10%-level. ** is at the 5%level and *** is at the 1%-level.
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Table 6. Child Labor and Openness (Dynamic Model - Change Measured at 2000)
1980

1970

1960

(EXP)

(IMP +
EXP)

(EXP)

9.79***
(0.94)

9.93***
(0.88)

6.40***
(0.58)

6.33***
(0.59)

0.0004***
(0.00)

0.0004***
(0.00)

0.0004***
(0.00)

0.0004**
(0.00)

0.0004**
(0.00)

0.0000
(0.00)

0.0000
(0.00)

0.0000*
(0.00)

0.0000*
(0.00)

0.0000*
(0.00)

0.0000*
(0.00)

-0.01
(0.02)

-0.01
(0.04)

-0.01
(0.02)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.04
(0.03)

R2

15.1

14.8

20.2

20.0

9.9

10.5

n

69

69

85

85

84

84

(EXP)

(IMP +
EXP)

11.27***
(1.14)

11.46***
(1.10)

0.0004***
(0.00)

A GNI
A OPEN

Constant
A GNI per
Capita

(IMP +
EXP)

1995

1990
(IMP +

(IMP +

EXP)

(EXP)

EXP)

(EXP)

3.97***

3.93***

1.88***

1.88***

(0.34)

(0.33)

(0.15)

(0.15)

A GNI per
Capita

0.0009***
(0.00)

0.0009***
(0.00)

0.0007*
(0.00)

0.0006*
(0.00)

A GNI

0.0000"*
(0.00)

0.0000"*
(0.00)

0.0000**
(0.00)

0.0000*
(0.00)

0.01
(0.01)

0.01
(0.02)

0.01
(0.01)

0.02
(0.01)

11.1

10.9

7.8

7.5

Constant

A OPEN
R1=

86
86
84
84
n=
A positive coefficient means as the variable increases, the prevalence of child labor decreases.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * means statistically significant at the 10%-level. ** is at the 5%level and *** is at the 1%-level.
Table 7. Child Labor and Changes
GNI per Capita,/
GNI per Capita,10
GNIt/
GNI,.o
OPENt/
OPEN,. 0

(IMP + EXP)

(EXP)

0.01
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

-0.17***
(0.05)

-0.17**
(0.05)

-0.09
(0.06)

-0.07
(0.05)

A negative coefficient means as the variable increases, the prevalence of child labor decreases.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * means statistically significant at the 10%-level. ** is at the 5%level and *** is at the 1%-level.

